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RELIGION, PUBLIC LIFE AND THE STATE IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA.
Alexey D. Krindatch
Dr. Alexey D. Krindatch, a sociologist, is Research Director at the Patriarch
Athenagoras Orthodox Institute (Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley). Author of
Geography of Religions in Russia (Glenmary Research Center, 1996) he worked in
the research branch of the Center for Geographical and Political Studies, Institute of
Geography (Moscow) from 1990-2005.
Summary:
Despite post-Communist “religious revival” Russian society remains largely agnostic. The
proportion of Russians who declare themselves “religious” grew from 25 % in 1985 to 62 % in 2004,
but the share of practicing believers who attend church on a regular base and fulfill religious
requirements remains as low as in the early 1990s. However, both religious identity and religious
organizations are playing an increasing role in the country’s social and political affairs. Two aspects of
“popular religiosity” are of importance. First, religious self-identification reflects neither a personal
belief system nor a regular religious practice. Religion is frequently perceived simply as part of the
traditional cultural environment and a component of ethnic identity.
Second, under decline of public confidence in the state institutions, mass media, and political
associations the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys “intuitive” sympathy and confidence of both the
religious and agnostic population. As to Church – State and inter-religious relations, the “Russian
model” seemed finally to crystallize under Putin’s regime.
1). Introduction
Religion and religious organizations can contribute significantly to the shaping of a
healthy civil society. At the same time, under certain political and social circumstances,
religion can serve - or it can be used - to undermine the principles of tolerance and pluralism.
It is the way in which religion is incorporated into the social realm which determines the
nature of religion’s contribution to society and democracy.
The last decade of the 20th century was a period of turbulent transitions in the
religious life of post-Soviet Russia. Until the late 1980s, for 70 years a “militant atheism” had
been a part of state policy and official ideology of the USSR. Religious activity and religious
organizations were at least discouraged and, in some cases, severely repressed. In Russia by
the time of Gorbachev’s policy of political liberalization three out of four Russians did not
believe in God [Greely, 1994, p.253]. After the cessation of an atheistic state policy in the
late 1980s, all post-Soviet states have experienced a so-called religious revival. In the
particular case of Russia, two events can be seen as symbolising the beginning and the end of
this transitional process. The first one took place in 1988, when a religious festival - the
Millennium of the Baptism of Russia - was officially declared a national festival and was
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sponsored by the state. Under the conditions of a still Communist regime and technically
atheistic state, this was hardly believable for most Russians.
The second event is dated December 1999. After the unexpected resignation of
President Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin went to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch
Alexey II, to ask for his blessing to serve as the temporary leader of the country until the next
proper presidential elections took place. By then this was seen by the majority of the
population as a perfectly natural move on the part of a political leader.
For social scientists and scholars of religion the break-up of the atheistic Communist
regime in Russia provided a unique opportunity to analyze whether a long period of enforced
secularization would destroy religion and leave it so enfeebled that it has little resiliency once
the oppression is lifted. Or whether, on the contrary, religion would revive, and - if so - in
what form and which implications this has for the civil society. In this paper I shall attempt
to outline three major subjects:
- the phenomenon of what I call “popular religiosity” in today’s Russia;
- the slowly but yet clearly crystallizing model of Church – State relations under
Putin’s regime;
- the challenges and issues in the sphere of religious freedom and tolerance.
2) Major Components of Russia’s Religious Landscape: Past and Present.
The religious demography and geography of Russia as well as the changes that have
occurred in the country’s religious landscape during the 20th century are important for the
correct understanding of the current religious life of Russian society and of the major issues
in the sphere of religious tolerance and church-state relations.
Territories with populations as diverse in their religious and ethno-cultural traditions
as for example, Bulgaria, Norway and Iran were for centuries incorporated into the common
geographic, political and administrative space of the Russian Empire and, subsequently, the
USSR. According to the 1897 census, of the Russian Empire’s 125 million residents, 72.0 %
were Orthodox Christians, 9.2 % Catholics, 3.0 % Protestants (at that time primarily
Lutherans), 11.1 % Muslims, 4.2 % Jews and 0.4 % Buddhist [Obshchij 1905].
There were a number of essential changes in the religious demography of the country
during the period from 1897 (last pre-revolutionary census) to 1991 (break-up of USSR).
First, thanks to the atheistic state policy under the Communist regime, the number of
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agnostics (non-believers) increased significantly. Second, the proportion of Orthodox
Christians decreased. To a certain extent, this was a result of the fact that in 1917 the Russian
Orthodox Church was deprived of its established status and lost many nominal “Orthodox”
who were only formally affiliated with this only state church. More important, however, was
the fact that originally in the 1920-30s Communist antireligious policies were aimed
particularly at the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the symbols of pre-revolutionary
monarchic Russia.
Third, there was a relative growth in the Islamic population. In both the Russian
Empire and the USSR Islam was the traditional religion of certain ethnic groups, who always
had higher rates of demographic growth than the Christian population. In addition to this
factor, the Soviet religious policies were generally more tolerant towards Islam than towards
the Russian Orthodox Church.
Fourth, there was a significant decrease in the proportion of Catholics, which was
chiefly the result of territorial changes, when Poland – a major enclave of Catholicism in the
Russian Empire – became an independent state in 1918. Fifth, there was a dramatic decline in
Judaism. This was mainly the result of the Holocaust (the majority of Jews in the USSR lived
in the western parts of the country which were occupied by the Nazis during WWII), that was
augmented by large scale emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and to the USA in the 1970-80s.
Although today’s Russia is only one of fifteen post-Soviet states – former republics
of the USSR – it remains a vast multiethnic and multi-cultural area, and it is almost as diverse
religiously as it was in the past (Tab.1).
Tab.1 Religious Composition of the Population in the Russian Empire, former USSR and post-Soviet








Population total 125.640.000 270.000.000 149.000.000
Orthodox (Eastern) Christians 72.0 22.8 33-40 (50-60 mln.)
Catholics (Roman and Greek
Catholics)
9.2 5.5 0.2 (300 thous.)
Protestants 3.0 3.0 0.7 (1 mln.)
Muslims 11.1 18.5 10-13 (15-20 mln.)
Buddhists 0.4 0.4 0.7 (1 mln.)
Judaists 4.2 0.2 0.7 (1 mln.)
Non-Believers - about 50.0 about 50
Sources of data: a) Russian Empire: [Obshij..., 1905]; b) USSR and post-Soviet Russia: [Religioznyje, 1996],
[Religija, 1997].
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As for the country’s present religious geography, it is important to note that while
followers of Orthodox Christianity comprise by the far prevailing majority of all believers,
there are also significant parts of the Russian Federation where the other religions –
especially Islam and Buddhism – dominate (Map 1).
From the perspective of the social and political impact on the contemporary Russian
society, two religions – Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity and Islam – deserve special attention.
Both religions can be regarded as indigenous, since they both took roots before the
emergence of the Russian nation as a politically integrated unit.
Orthodoxy Christianity had formally become the state religion of Kievan Rus as
early as A.D. 988, when Grand Prince Vladimir decided to convert his principality to the
Christianity of the Byzantine Rite. By the time of the revolution of 1917, there were about
77,800 parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the Russian Empire. After two
decades of the Communist policy of “militant atheism” only 3,100 were still functioning in
the entire USSR, with none at all in 25 administrative regions (“oblasti”) in the territory of
the current Russian Federation [Pospelovskij, 1995].
After the onset of Gorbachev’s policy of political liberalization the ROC began to
revive rapidly. In 1988, the ROC had about 6900 parishes, 21 monasteries, 5 theological
schools. Its clergy comprised 74 bishops and about 6800 priests and deacons. Today, on the
territory of the former USSR, the Moscow Patriarchate has about 23,350 parishes, more than
600 monasteries, and over 60 theological educational institutions. Its clergy comprises 162
bishops and 19,500 priests and deacons [Russkaja, 2005], [Orthodoxia, 2004].
No questions about personal religious affiliation have been asked in the recent 2002
census, but various sociological surveys and expert estimates indicate that 50-60 million
Russian citizens identify themselves as Orthodox Christians [Religioznyje, 1996]. In other
words Orthodoxy is a religion of 33 - 40 % of the total population or of about 2/3-3/4 of all
believers in post-Soviet Russia.
It is important to note that the ROC has today a significant social impact on a larger
proportion of Russia’s population than those who actually consider themselves her members.
For instance, a national survey in 2004 has revealed that the ROC enjoys the confidence of
50% of the country’s total population and in this respect is well ahead of the government,
parliament, the mass media and political parties [Levada, 2004].
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The official position of the ROC regarding its role in society was declared in the
document called “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church” which was
adopted by an all-church Council of bishops in 2000 [Bases, 2000]. In general, the main goal
of the ROC is seen as religious, and moral and educational work with special emphasis on
evangelism and catechizing activities. In relationship to the broader society the ROC
considers herself to be a unifying and reconciling power. The pattern of relations between the
ROC and the Russian state as described in “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian
Orthodox Church” appears somewhat controversial. On the one hand, “The Church not only
prescribes for her children to obey state power regardless of the convictions and faith of its
bearers, but also prays for it.” On the other hand, however, “God's commandment to fulfil the
task of salvation in any situation and under any circumstances is above this loyalty”. While
recognizing the secular nature of the Russian state, the ROC believes that “the principle of
the secular state cannot be understood as implying that religion should be radically forced out
of all the spheres of the people's life, that religious associations should be debarred from
decision-making on socially significant problems and deprived of the right to evaluate the
actions of the authorities.”
Furthermore, “in implementing her social, charitable, educational and other socially
significant projects, the Church may rely on the support and assistance of the state. She also
has the right to expect that the state, in building its relations with religious bodies, will take
into account the number of their followers and the place they occupy in forming the
historical, cultural and spiritual image of the people and their civic stand.” In brief, the
position of the ROC regarding its role in the Russian society was formulated by Patriarch
Alexey II as follows: “Being separated from the state, the church can not be separated to any
extent from the people and from the society.” [NG-Religii, 27.11.1997].
As for political involvement, according to the “Bases...”, the ROC “acknowledges the
presence of various political convictions among her episcopate, clergy and laity”, but “it is
impossible for the Church's Supreme Authorities and for the clergy to participate in such
activities of political organizations and election processes as public support for the political
organizations or particular candidates running for elections and so forth. The clergy are not
allowed to be nominated for elections to any body of representative power at any level”
[Bases, 2000]. This prohibition on direct political involvement does not exclude however the
growing practice of official agreements signed between the Moscow Patriarchate and various
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Russian national ministries (the last one was an agreement about co-operation between the
ROC and Russia’s Ministry of Health in March 2003 [Soglashenie, 2003]).
On the regional level, similar agreements about co-operation have been concluded
between many individual dioceses of the ROC and executive state authorities of the Russian
administrative provinces. Since 1995, a special department of the ROC is responsible for
contacts and for co-operation between the ROC and the Russian Army.
The ROC must also be seen as an important actor in Russia’s foreign affairs.
Whereas in the Russian Empire and in the USSR the ROC was a predominantly national
Church, after the breakup of the USSR it has become a truly international organization. The
headquarters of the ROC remains in Moscow, but today more than half of the parishes and
clergy of the ROC are no longer in Russia itself, but in the other former Soviet republics. In
the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Moldova, the branches of the ROC are the largest religious
organizations of these currently independent states (Tab.2).
Tab. 2 Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in Russian Federation and Abroad.
Countries:



































9.515 131 7.995 14
Byelorussia (2003) Exarchate of Russian
Orthodox Church:10
dioceses / 10 bishops
















Lithuania (2000) 1 diocese / 1 bishop 40 2 37 0
Latvia (2003) since 1992 -
autonomous
“Orthodox Church in
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”Estonian Apostolic
Orthodox Church”: 1
diocese / 1 bishop




(i.e. equal to Russian
Orthodox Church)
0 0 0 0
Armenia (2003) a part of diocese of
Maikop (Russia)





1 diocese/1bishop 6 + 12 + 7 0 20+17+3
0
Kazakhstan (2003) Since 2003 -
“Metropolitan
district”
3 dioceses / 3 bishops






















1 diocese / 1 bishop 105 5 133 1
United Kingdom
(2002)
1 diocese / 3 bishops 22 0 32 0
France + Italy +
Switzerland +
Spain + + Portugal
(2003)
1 diocese / 1 bishop
7 + 16 +
+ 4 + 3 +
+ 2
4 + 0 +
+ 1 + 1 +
+ 0
21 + 10 +





1 diocese / 1 bishop 2 + 8 0 1 + 2 0
Germany (2002) 1 diocese / 2 bishops 44 0 45 0
Belgium (2002) 1 diocese / 2 bishop 7 2 5 0
Netherlands
(2002)
1 diocese / bishop
position is vacant
4 2 5 0
USA (2002) “Patriarchal parishes
in the USA”: no
dioceses / 1 bishop
31 1 42 0
Canada (2002) “Patriarchal parishes
in the Canada” no
dioceses / 1 bishop







1 diocese / 1 bishop 20 0
about
10 0





2 0 2 0
Japan (2000) since 1970 -
autonomous 70 1 18 1









Australia (3), Bulgaria (1), Chechy (2), Denmark (2), Egypt (2), Finland (4),
Greece (1 monastery), Iceland (1), Iran (1), Ireland (1), Israel (3+5 monasteries),
Japan (1), Lebanon (1), Marocco (1), Mexico (1), Mongolia (1), Norway (3),





Germany (Duesseldorf), Switzerland (Genf), Syria (Damascus), USA
(New York), Belgium (Brussels), Thailand (Bangkok).
a) “Educational institutions” = theological academies+theological seminaries+theological schools+Orthodox
universities.
Principal sources of data: 1) Official web-site of the Russian Orthodox Church: www.russian-orthodox-
church.org..ru; 2) N.Mitrokhin, S.Timofeeva, “Episkopy i eparchii Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Cerkvi” (in Russian:
“Bishops and dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church”), Panorama, Moskva, 1997; 3) Statistical data of
“Secretariat for interorthodox relations and foreign institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church” of “Department
of External Church Relations of Moscow Patriarchate” (not published) 4) Official web-site of the Byelorussian
Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church: www.church.by; 5) Official web-site of the “Ukrainian Orthodox
Church (Patriarchate Moscow)”: www.orthodox.org.ua; 6) Official web-site of the “Orthodox Church in
Moldova”: www.mitropolia.md. 7) “Tserkvi i religijni organizacii Ukraini u 2001 roci. Dovidnik” (in Ukrainian:
“Churches and religious organizations of Ukraine in 2001. Reference book”), Kiev: VIP, 2002.
The new geopolitical realities since the break-up of the USSR have resulted in
various conditions under which the parishes and dioceses of the ROC exist in different post-
soviet states. For example, in Ukraine or Estonia, the conflicts between the branches of the
ROC and the newly founded national Orthodox Churches that are independent from Moscow
have had significant implications both for internal politics in these states and for their
relations with Russia. They have been many times discussed in mass-media and analyzed
both by political scientists and scholars of religion.
While still under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate the parishes and
dioceses of the ROC in various former Soviet republics have been granted different legal
status, which reflect various degrees of self-administration and independence from Moscow.
Three major factors have determined the kind of the status achieved: the internal political
situation in each state, the relationship between the new national elite and political authorities
in Moscow, and the level of the social impact of the ROC in each post-Soviet state.
Basically, there are three major variants of adaptation of the ROC to the new political
and social conditions:
A) Autonomization. In Ukraine (1990), Moldova (1992), Latvia (1992) and Estonia (1992)
the branches of ROC were granted the status of “self-administered churches.” These churches
are independent from Moscow in their internal affairs and daily life. With the exception of
Estonia, the social impact of the ROC is considerable in all these states. At the same time,
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these are also the states where the new political leaderships in the early 1990s have pursued a
policy of keeping Moscow at a distance. Under conditions of growing nationalistic (and,
sometimes, anti-Russian) sentiments, providing the structures of the ROC with the maximum
autonomy was the only way of keeping the Orthodox parishes and dioceses under – even if
limited - subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate.
B) Maintaining unity with Moscow. In Byelorussia and in Kazakhstan the social authority
of the ROC is also significant. Yet in contrast to the states above both Byelorussia and
Kazakhstan have always maintained close relations with Russia. Consequently, there was no
need for any essential changes in the status the dioceses of the ROC. Both the “Byelorussian
Exarchate” and the recently established “Metropolitan District” of the ROC in Kazakhstan
serve simply as a convenient vehicle for the routine church-administration but make no claim
to increasing independence from Moscow.
C) Keeping the Status-Quo. This applies to the countries where the Orthodox Christians -
the members of the ROC – form only small religious minorities: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Lithuania, and the states of former Soviet Central Asia. The social and political impact of the
ROC in these countries is small, and change in the status of the ROC has not been an
important issue. At the same time as fulfilling their religious functions, the parishes of the
ROC serve also as important ethnic-cultural centers that consolidate the Slavic population
living in these states.
Islam is the second largest religion in the Russian Federation, and, in fact, more
Muslims live in Russia than in Saudi Arabia, Islam’s country of origin. There are two main
Islamic areas: the Northern Caucasus and the lower Volga Basin (Map 1). The penetration of
Islam into the Caucasus began in the epoch of the Arabic conquest. In 685, the Arabs
captured the seaport of Derbent (currently in the Russian republic of Daguestan), and in 722-
723 they occupied the internal areas of Daguestan. Yet, it was not until the 18th century that
the “Islamization” of the entire Caucasus was completed, when Islam had finally taken root
among the ethnically diverse peoples of the Western Caucasus: Adygs, Kabardins, Cherkess,
Balkars, Karatchai [Islam v Rossii, 1996]. The formal date of conversion to Islam of the
Turkic-speaking peoples of the Volga Basin is 922, when Islam became the state religion of
what was then known as “Volgo-Kama Bulgaria” upon the initiative of king Almush after a
visit of the delegation from the Baghdad Caliphate.
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Besides the Caucasus and Volga areas, substantial Muslim minorities are present in
Southern Ural (Kurgan, Chelyabinsk, Orenburg regions), and in Western Siberia (especially -
Tyumen region), as well as in capital Moscow. According to various estimates, between
600.000 and 1.2 million Muslims live in the Moscow city and Moscow district (“oblast”)
[Malashenko, 1998].
Today there are over 3500 officially state-registered local Islamic religious
communities in Russia (excluding regions of Chechnya and Ingushetia for which statistics are
not available), but neither the real number of de-facto functioning mosques nor that of the
actual Islamic believers is known. The commonly accepted estimate of the number of
mosques existing in Russia is about 7000 [Malashenko,1999]. Evaluating the number of
Islamic believers is complicated by fact that the term “Muslim” is frequently used in the
broader ethnic rather than in a religious sense and encompasses therefore not only practicing
believers but all the members of ethnicities of traditionally Islamic religious background:
Tatars, Bashkirs, and the culturally and linguistically various peoples of the Caucasus. The
estimates range therefore from 12 to 20 million Muslims [Halbach, 1996].
There is no doubt, however, that the proportion of Islamic ethnic groups in the
population of the Russian Federation is increasing. Whereas in 1937, the “ethnic Moslems”
made up 5.9% Russia’s total population, in 2002 their proportion was as high as 8.9 %
[Perepis, 2002]. The data of the recent (2002) Russian census in comparison with that of the
last (1989) Soviet census in the table below confirm this thesis. Demographic prognoses for
the next decades agree that the Muslim component will continue to grow as the ethnically
Russian component decreases [Halbach, 1996].
Today, “ethnic Muslims” form an absolute majority of the population in seven out of
89 administrative provinces of Russia. These are: the republics of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan,
Daguestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karatchayevo-Cherkessia.
Tab. 3 The largest Islamic ethnic groups in Russia (1989-2002).
1989 2002 Changes: 1989=100%
Tatars 5.522.000 5.558.000 101 %
Bashkirs 1.345.000 1.673.800 124 %
Chechens 900.000 1.361.000 151 %
Avars 545.000 757.100 139 %
Kabardinians 386.000 520.100 135 %
Dargins 353.000 510.200 144 %
Azerbaijanians 336.000 621.500 185 %
Kumyks 277.000 422.500 153 %
I ngushs 215.000 411.800 192 %
Lezgins 257.000 411.600 160 %
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Source of data: [Narody, 1994], [Perepis, 2002]
Any analysis of Islam in post-Soviet Russia requires careful consideration of strong
ethnic, regional and even religious differentiations. The Muslim community of Russia
consists of almost 40 ethnic groups, who speak different languages and have various cultures
and traditions. Some of them live in compact areas and some are dispersed all across Russia.
The particular forms of Islamic religious practice in Russia differ strongly from place to
place. The majority of Russia’s Muslims are Sunnis, but the Tats and Azerbaijanians living in
the North Caucasus are Shiites. Most of Sunnis follow the Hanafite school, but the Chechens,
Ingushs and Avars are the adherents of Shafiite mazkhab (school). Alongside “official
Islam,” the mystical Sufism (represented by Naqshbandiya and Quadiriya religious orders) is
widespread in Chechnya, Daguestan and in Ingushetia. Remanants of pre-Islamic tribal
beliefs and the norms of the customary law – the so-called “adat” - have a big influence on
Islamic practices among the Adygei ethno-linguistic family (Adyg, Kabardinian and Cherkess
peoples) [Islam, 1996]. As far as degree of religiosity is concerned, the Muslims of the
Volga-Basin (Tatars, Bashkirs) in the Central-European part of Russia are much more secular
than those in the Northern Caucasus, especially in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daguestan,
where Islamic prescriptions and rules are obeyed more strictly. It was in Chechnya and
Daguestan, where as early as the beginning of 1990s several attempts were made to restore
the system of Sharia’h law [Halbach, 1996], [Islam, 1996]. The issue of the incorporation of
some elements of Sharia into the secular legislation has also been debated in the republic of
Ingushetia [Novoe, 2000].
It was also in Daguestan that the radical-conservative Wahabi movement, advocating
a return to an original “pure Islam,” made its first appearance in Russia in the early 1990s,
spreading fast in other parts of the North Caucasus.
There are several reasons for the recent emergence and spread of the Wahabi
movement in the Russian Caucasus. First, as a result of 70 years of Communist anti-religious
policy the Islamic regions of Russia have to a large extent lost their own specific historically-
rooted religious traditions. This absence of cultural immunity to external influences and the
crisis of identity in post-Soviet society created the favorable conditions for the spread of the
new “imported” Islamic movements and ideas. Second, the dynamic rise of Wahhabism is
characteristic of areas experiencing high unemployment and economic decline. This is the
case of Russia’s Islamic regions in Northern Caucasus, where the ideas of restoring equality
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and social justice propagated by Wahhabi leaders have become popular, particularly among
the younger generation of Russian Muslims. Third, the increasing activity of foreign Islamic
missionaries and financial support of the Wahabi movement is backed from abroad, mainly
from Saudi Arabia and from Egypt [Razhbandinov, 1998].
The differences within Russia’s Muslim community are evident not only when one
compares two big macro-cultural Islamic regions, the North Caucasus and the Volga-Ural
area. They are also present within single geographic areas. In the Caucasus, the relation to
Islam is more superficial among the Adygei peoples in the Western Caucasus than among
Chechens or the various peoples living in Daguestan. In the religious culture of the Adygei
peoples, Islam co-exists peacefully with elements of Christianity and with remains of various
pagan practices and beliefs. Hence, Islam is perceived here more as a style of life and cultural
tradition.
By contrast, in Chechnya and in Daguestan, Islam is much more a politic-religious
phenomenon, and the social-political impact of Islam is especially evident there.
The mountainous republic of Daguestan in the Caucasus is a peculiar case of ethno-
cultural mosaic combined with a variety of local Islamic religious practices, which
demonstrated an amazing persistence even under the Communist regime. As a result
Daguestan, along with neighboring rebellious Chechnya, has assumed a leading position in
the process of Islamic revival in the Russian North Caucasus [Gammer, 1995], [Islam, 1996].
Of all Russian administrative provinces Daguestan has the densest Islamic “religious
infrastructure”: more than 600 legally registered mosques for 2.6 million of total population
[Ministry, 2004], [Perepis, 2002].
The Daguestanian town of Bujnaksk is widely recognized as the main Islamic
educational and theological center for the entire North Caucasus. In the Russian Federation, it
is only in Daguestan that the Islamic religion has been taught as an ordinary subject in the
state schools since 1992 [Halbach , 1996].
Nevertheless, despite these strong Islamic traditions, the idea of “Islamic unity” has
neither become the basis for the creation of a new post-Soviet identity for Daguestan’s
ethnically diverse population nor prevented latent and even open ethno-religious conflicts in
this republic. The majority of the population in Daguestan comprises seven ethnicities -
Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Laks, Tabassarans, Azerbaijanians – each numbering
100,000 to 750,000. There are historical tensions amongst these ethnic clans and competition
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for representation in republican and local administrations. These interethnic tensions have
caused Daguestanian Islam to split into several administrative structures (“muftiats”,
“quadiats”) that co-exist on the same territory and play an essential role in the process of
political mobilization within the various ethnic groups.
The underestimation of the political importance of the Islamic factor by the state
authorities in Daguestan and in the North Caucasus in general has led to the first armed
confrontation between two Muslim religious communities - the followers of the Sufi
brotherhood “Naqshebandiya” and adherents of the Wahabi movement - in the Daguestanian
villages Tchaban Makhi and Kara Makhi in May 1997. The appeal to holy religious war
(“jihad”) against Russians has been widely used by leaders of Chechen paramilitary
groupings as a main slogan in the war with Russian Federal troops.
Whereas the growth of radical conservative Islamic movements in the Caucasus
became evident already at the beginning of the 1990s, it was not until the late 1990s, when
regional and federal Russian state authorities recognized it openly and paid attention to this
fact.
In July 1998, the “Congress of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus” gathered in the
city of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. The declaration of this Congress was addressed to
the secular authorities of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daguestan and it required “to outlaw all
extremist movements, to establish strict control over all Islamic educational institutions and
Islamic mass-media in order to prevent the penetration of Wahabi ideology into society”
[Ignatenko, 1999]. Later the President of Ingushetia, Mr. Ruslan Aushev, signed a decree
which imposed a ban on the activity of Wahabi organizations on the territory of the Ingush
Republic.
In September 1999, the parliament of the Republic of Daguestan adopted the law
“About prohibition of the Wahabi and other extremist activities on the territory of Republic
of Daguestan.” This law was the very first example in post-Soviet Russia, when a regional
legislature not only imposed certain limitations and restrictions in the sphere of religious life
in general, but also directly named and outlawed a particular religious movement.
The extreme case of the numerous splits and inter-Islamic tensions in Daguestan
reflects the general situation within the Islamic community of Russia. The repeatedly
declared aspiration for some sort of unification of all Russian Muslims is overwhelmed by
disintegrative tendencies based on ethnic tensions and political ambitions of various Islamic
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leaders. Consequently, there is at the moment no single Islamic religious organization or
leader that can claim to speak on behalf of a majority of Russia’s Muslims.
The relations between the Islamic and Orthodox Christian (or, in broader sense,
Slavic) populations in Russia is a sensitive issue. In the state-controlled mass-media, and by
federal and regional authorities and even by most religious leaders these relations have been
traditionally presented as tolerant and mutually respectful. Furthermore, the case of “Islam
and Orthodox Christianity in Russia” has been frequently used to demonstrate the peaceful
co-existence of two religious traditions in Russia (sometimes in contrast to the tensions
between Russia’s “traditional” religions and various “new” religious movements). Yet, the
prolonged military conflict in Chechnya and the numerous terrorist acts in various Russian
major cities have challenged seriously the relations between the Slavic and Islamic
communities of Russia.
A survey completed in June 2003, which aimed to analyze public opinion about
Islam in Russia, produced rather disturbing results. Answering the question, “Which one out
of six religions is for you most “strange by the spirit,” a much larger group of respondents
(26%) chose Islam in comparison with Buddhism (21%), Judaism (18%), Protestantism
(13%), Roman Catholicism (9%) or Orthodox Christianity (1%). Thirty two percent of
respondents rejected firmly the possibility that their son would marry an Islamic woman and
45% did so when asked about possibility of marriage of their daughters with an Islamic man.
Answering a general question about the influence of Islam on the modern world, 49% of
respondents defined this influence as “negative” and only 14% believed it is a “positive”
(37% were unable to respond this question) [Soldatov, 2003].
3) Religious Revival in post-Soviet Russia: the Realities of “Popular Religiosity.”
There is little doubt that religion has become an influential social force and that
religious institutions form today a significant component of the Russian post-Soviet civil
society. Yet the people’s actual religious participation and involvement is a contradictory
issue and it requires careful analysis.
First, the rise in personal religiosity is evident and astonishing if measured as the
proportion of persons who identify themselves as "religious" or as “believers in God” or,
more specifically, as followers of a particular religion. According to surveys, by the mid-
1990s about 50% of Russian citizens declared themselves religious while before Gorbachev’s
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policy of political liberalization this figure was only 25% [Greely, 1994]. Although not as
rapidly as in the early 1990s, this growth continues: 62% of respondents identified
themselves as “believers” in the national survey carried out in 2004 [LEVADA, 2004-7]. In
other words, according to the data above, more than one third of all Russians (or one half of
former non-believers) has abandoned atheism after the collapse of the Communist regime.
Moreover, the proportion of “neophytes” who newly came to believe is significantly higher
than in any other formerly Communist Eastern European country [Greely, 1994, p.257].
Second, in today’s Russia the relationship between personal belief, religious identity
and actual religious practice is complicated and controversial. In fact, religious self-
identification frequently reflects neither a personal belief system nor a regular religious
practice. Put another way, seven decades of consistent “atheisation” resulted in a society in
which there exists a great difference between the notions of “being Orthodox” (or Muslim, or
Jewish, etc.) and “believing in God,” and “practicing religion and participating in the Church
life.” Religion is often perceived simply as part of the traditional cultural environment, and as
a component of ethnic identity and style of life: “I am Russian and, therefore, Orthodox” or “I
am Tatar and, therefore, Muslim.” Therefore the results of surveys always look paradoxical,
because they indicate a higher total of respondents identifying themselves as Orthodox,
Muslims, Buddhists, and so on, than the proportion of those who answer “yes” to the general
question “Do you believe in God?” or “Are you a religious person?” (Tab.4).
Tab.4 Personal belief and religious identity in Russia: (1998, as % of respondents)
Are you a religious person? What is your religion?
“Yes” 45.1
Russian Orthodox 52.5
“Christian” (without further definition) 5.1
Muslim 2.4
Various other religions 1.1
Total: 61.0
“No” 38.3 “I am not a believer” 32.8
“Difficult to answer” 16.6 “Difficult to answer” 6.2
Source of data: [Mtchedlov, 1998].
In turn, both the proportion of those who identify themselves as belonging to a
particular religion and the share of those who simply say that they are religious are much
higher than the number of actually practicing believers: those who regularly attend church
services and who fulfill other religious rituals and requirements (Tab.5).
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Tab.5 Evolution of Religious Orientations and Religious Practice in Russia: 1985-2004.
(% of the total population, according to the results of public-opinion polls)
1985 1989 1991 1996 1998 2002 2004
Non-Believers 75 66 61 43 38 33 32
Believers 25 33 32 48 45 57 62
Those Who








2 4 3 2 2
% of those who
are baptized 65 76 77 76






Source of data: - a) 1985: [Greely, 1994]; b) 1989-2004 - sociological surveys carried out by “All-Russian Center
for Study of Public Opinion” (”VCIOM”) – currently “Levada-Center” - and partly published in [Obshestvennoe,
2002] and [Obshestvennoe, 2004].
For instance, among those who say that they are “Orthodox” less than 15% attend
church services at least once a month (Tab.6). The vast majority of “Orthodox believers” in
Russia participate only in the one-time church ceremonies (baptizing of the children, church
wedding or funerals) or in the major religious festivals such as Easter or Christmas. In the
other words, the sense of being Orthodox and belonging to the Orthodox Church is typically
limited to the fact of baptism and to some very rare participation in special church
ceremonies.
Tab.6 Regularity of Religious Practice in Russia among Orthodox Christians: 1991 - 1998 (as % of those
who identify themselves as “Orthodox”).
Attend church services: 1991 / 1998 Receive eucharist: 1991 / 1998
Monthly and more frequently 13.2 / 13.8 Monthly and more frequently 6.9 / 4.7
Several times a year 39.0 / 33.2 Several times a year 14.2 / 10.9
Less than once a year 9.1 / 15.0 Less than once a year 16.2 / 10.4
Never 35.7 / 36.8 Never 59.5 / 65.9
Difficult to answer 1.5 / 1.1 Difficult to answer 3.2 / 3.1
Source of data: sociological survey carried out by Russian Centere for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM) in
1991 and in October 1998. Partly published in [Dubin, 1999].
Even among the relatively strictly observing Muslims believers of the Northern
Caucasus the rates of regular fulfillment of various Islamic religious rites are low: 28% by
Ingushs, 34% by Avars, 36% by Chechens, 43% by Darguins [Krickij, 1997].
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In fact, despite the above-mentioned self-declared conversion to religion of every
third Russian, the indices of actual religious practice in Russia are among the lowest in
comparison with the other formerly Communist European countries (Tab. 7). Moreover,
Russians themselves confirm the superficial character of their religiosity, as only 3.4%
define themselves as “very religious persons” and only 8% say that “religion and faith are
very important to me” (Tab.5).
















2.1 8.3 3.1 5.1
Russia 3.4 23.6 3.6 12.3
Ukraine 3.8 23.0 14.0 19.3
Slowenia 5.1 21.9 20.3 14.2
Czech
Republic
6.2 13.7 8.9 9.0
Byelorussi
a
6.3 35.4 11.3 21.4
Lithuania 6.4 28.6 10.4 18.1
Slovakia 10.4 35.7 32.7 29.2
Romania 11.6 61.9 25.1 53.4
Poland 19.5 55.0 53.3 37.2
Hungary 22.6 27.4 13.6 20.9
Croatia 33.3 51.5 25.0 30.1
Sources of data: a) Tomka (1998); sociological surveys carried out by the Institute of sociology of the
Byelorussian National Academy of Sciences in August-September 1998 (unpublished) and by “Russian Center
for Public Opinion Research” (“VCIOM”) in Oktober 1998 (unpublished).
To sum up, the variety of approaches to measuring religiosity in today’s Russia
allows for endless controversies and speculations on this subject: three quarters of the
population are baptized, 50-60% - depending on the wording of the question – claim to be
“believers,” 6-8% attend church on a regular monthly base. Most expert estimates agree,
however, that between 10 and 15% of those who define themselves as religious persons or,
in the other words, between 5 and 8% of the total population, can be said to be “practicing
believers.”
Third, all above mentioned measures of religiosity demonstrate significant ethnic,
regional, social and gender distinctions. The indices of religiosity depend especially
strongly on ethnic background of respondents. They are much higher in the case of Islamic
ethnic groups. Even among relatively “agnostic” Muslims of the Volga region in the
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Republic of Tatarstan, 67% of urban and 86 % of rural Tatars identify themselves as
faithful Muslims (compared with 34% and 43 % in 1989) [Musina, 1997].
The largest proportions of believers are among Islamic ethnic groups in the
Northern Caucasus such as Tchechens (97%), Ingushs (95%), Karatchaevs (88%) [Krickij,
1997].
As for the Slavic population, the level of religiosity differs significantly from one
geographic area to another. Generally, a higher percentage of believers is characteristic of
the Southern European part of Russia - an area of old-settlements with a relatively low
proportion of recent migrants and a relatively large rural population. By contrast,
territories of more recent settlement with a predominantly urban and industrial population
(Siberia, Far East, Northern European part of the country) are more “godless.” For
instance, surveys show that almost 80% of respondents in the Voronezh region (about 500
km. south-west of Moscow) and 76% in the Stavropol region (the most southerly of the
administrative regions of European Russia) answer “yes” to the question “Do you believe
in God?” At the same time only 28 % do so in industrial Petrozavodsk - the capital of the
republic of Carelia on Kola Peninsula in Northern Russia. [INTAS/Prometee/VCIOM,
1996]. In the capital Moscow in 1997, the share of believers nearly corresponded with the
then average for Russia as a whole: 50.1 %, comprising 39.7 % Orthodox, 6.2 % “simply
Christians”, 1.8% Muslims, 1.4% Catholics, 0.6 % Buddhists and 0.2 % - Judaists and
Protestants. [Rossija...,1997].
There are also evident differences in religiosity among various social and
professional groups. In today’s Russia the most “godless” seems to be the industrial
workers and free-lance intellectuals; more religious are peasants, qualified technicians
(engineers), office workers and pensioners; the highest proportions of believers are among
students, business men, soldiers and house-wives. [Novyj,1996, p.98]
Finally, gender was and remains a significant differentiating factor. Today about
68% of women in Russia say that they are religious, but only 46% of men do so [Stark,
2002]. These gender differences appear almost as high as in the Soviet past. In answer to
the question “Were your parents religious?”, 56% of respondents said their mothers were,
but only 33% said that their fathers were [VCIOM, 1999].
Interestingly enough, in comparison with the obvious ethnic, geographical, social
and gender differences, surveys show that differences in religiosity among the various age
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groups are tending to decline [Mtchedlov, 1998]. So are those amongst groups with
different educational levels. For instance, in 1991, only 16% of persons with a university
degree said that they were religious in comparison with 58% among those who did not
have college-level education. In 1998, however, the corresponding numbers were 46 and
58% respectively [Dubin, 1999].
Fourth, the decade of the 1990s has been marked by the dramatic decline of public
confidence in the various institutions of state power, mass media, public and political
associations and, at the same time, by the high popularity of religious organizations, with
the Russian Orthodox Church in first place. Today, about half the population declare their
trust in the Russian Orthodox Church and, in this context, the popular confidence in the
Russian Orthodox Church is greater than in any other state or public institution (Tab. 8).
Tab.8 Public Confidence in various State, Political and Public Institutions in Russia: 1994-2004 (as %
of those who: “trust or rather trust” / “mistrust or rather mistrust”)
Do you trust: 1994: trust / mistrust 1999: trust / mistrust 2004: trust/ mistrust
President of
Russia
22 / 68 5 / 91 63 / 10
Church 55 / 21 57 / 22 49 / 16
Russian Army 52 / 36 52 / 37 42 / 30
Governement No data 22 / 72 42 / 30
Mass Media 34 / 58 33 / 60 25 / 48
Trade Unions 18 / 60 18 / 56 19 / 39
Police 25 / 67 20 / 73 18 / 56
Parliament 13 / 16 10 / 82 24 / 71 (2003)
Political Parties No data 7 / 76 (1998) 11 / 59
Source of data: - [VCIOM 1994, 1999], [Levada 2004]
In other words, in a society which remains agnostic by its nature, the Church
enjoys an intuitive support and sympathy of the relative majority of the population. The
roots of this Church popularity in the largely secular society are in the fundamental and -
for a majority of population - painful political, economic and social transformations of the
last 15 years. In the spiritual sphere following the crash of the clear “black-white”
Communist ideology these transformations have resulted in an atmosphere of frustration
and spiritual perplexity. Under conditions of public frustration and low confidence placed
in institutions of state power and political organizations the Church has been seen by many
as a symbol of stability and a last stronghold of declining moral and family values.
The challenging question is: What are the implications of the public authority of
the Church for the continuing process of civil society building, for the creation of a new
national identity and for the “social reconciliation” of the increasingly polarized Russian
society?
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4) Church-State Relations and Religious Freedom in Russia: the Issues and
Challenges
The 2004 “International Religious Freedom Report” released by the US
Department of State evaluated the conditions of religious freedom in Russia as follows:
“Although the Constitution provides for the equality of all religions before the law and the
separation of church and state, the Government did not always respect these provisions.
Some federal agencies and many local authorities continued to restrict the rights of various
religious minorities. Legal obstacles to registration under a complex 1997 law "On
Freedom of Conscience and Associations," which seriously disadvantages religious groups
new to the country, and which had eased somewhat in the period covered by the last
report, were cited as the basis for banning Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow and upheld in
the second appeal of the case. There were indications that the security services
increasingly treated the leadership of some minority religious groups as security threats.
Religious matters are not a source of societal hostility for most citizens, although many
citizens firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox Church
(ROC) is at the heart of what it means to be Russian. Popular attitudes toward traditionally
Muslim ethnic groups are negative in many regions, and there are manifestations of anti-
Semitism as well as societal hostility toward Roman Catholics and newer, non-Orthodox
religions. Instances of religiously motivated violence continue, although it often is
difficult to determine whether xenophobia, religion, or ethnic prejudices were the primary
motivation behind violent attacks. Conservative activists claiming ties to the ROC
disseminated negative publications and staged demonstrations throughout the country
against Roman Catholics, Protestants, members of Jehovah's Witnesses, and religions new
to the country. Leaders in the ROC have stated publicly their opposition to the presence of
Roman Catholics, Protestants, and newer religions” [Department, 2004].
In his article in First Things magazine, Lawrence Uzzell - a reputable expert on
religion in the post-Communist countries – summarized his vision of the situation in
Russia in somewhat more expressive language: “Religious liberty, after shrinking since
the mid-1990s, now seems to have reached an equilibrium. A year from now Russians will
probably not have any more freedom of conscience than they have today, but they should
not have significantly less.” According to Mr. Uzzell, the major reason for such a situation
is that: “Vladimir Putin has achieved everything he needs in church-state relations: he has
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no need to put believers in chains, because he already has them on a leash.” [Uzzell,
2004].
Today, one can be easily lost in the sea of various and not always consistent
information about church-state and inter-religious relations and about various questions of
religious freedom in Russia. Some of the articles, news, and reports on this subject deal
with the individual cases and circumstances, while the others focus on important general
tendencies. Some describe particular local situations, while the others reflect on the
problems and events which have national implications.
The major challenge - especially for an outsider to Russian society - is how to
interpret this diverse information from the perspective of Russia’s historical traditions and
in light of the country’s current political and social circumstances. In this chapter I
attempt to outline the historical and contemporary context in which the issue of religious
freedom in present-day Russia can be approached, understood and evaluated. A few
examples from the religious life of Russian society will help to illuminate major
tendencies in the church-state relations and in the area of religious freedom during the
most recent period – under conditions of the increasingly authoritarian regime of Mr.
Putin, which the Kremlin prefers to call a “vertical democracy.”
The first example is related to the establishment in February 2002 of the four
dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church (with headquarters in the cities of Moscow,
Saratov, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk). These dioceses have replaced the provisional so-called
“Apostolic administrations” (two were formed in 1991 and two in 1999). Roman
Catholics, being present in Russia for centuries, form only a tiny religious minority.
The expert estimates vary from 15-20,000 regularly practicing Catholic believers
up to 500,000 “virtual” Roman Catholics - counting all persons of Lithuanian, Polish, and
German origins, for whom Roman Catholicism can be seen as a traditional religion of their
ancestors [Lunkin, 2002]. At the same time, the elevation of the provisional
administrations to established ecclesiastical structures - dioceses - has reflected the
dynamic growth and institutionalization of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia during
the post-Soviet epoch.
The creation of the Catholic dioceses on the territory of the Russian Federation
has caused a very negative reaction by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church and
resulted in a temporary break in relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and Vatican.
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The analysis of the sets of arguments used in this dispute by the Catholic and Orthodox
sides is far beyond the limits of this article. The point is, however, that both the Russian
political establishment and the national state authorities intervened openly in the inter-
Church conflict by backing the position and lobbying for the interests of the Russian
Orthodox Church.
In a special appeal the members of the Russian parliament have requested the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to stop issuing entrance visas for Catholic clergy working in
Russia (the majority of the Roman Catholic priests in Russia are foreign nationals). The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has produced a statement, which stressed the fact that the
Vatican’s decision about creation of the dioceses was not coordinated with the Russian
Orthodox Church and, therefore, has recommended to cancel it [Platonov, 2003]. A
number of Catholic clergy (including the Bishop of Irkutsk, Ezhi Mazur) have been either
deported from the country or denied Russia’s entrance visas. Apparently the strengthening
of Catholicism in Russia not only contradicts the interests of the Moscow Patriarchate in
the competition for the souls of the faithful on the missionary field, but it also irritates the
the Kremlin and the national political leadership, for whom the Roman Catholic Church
has been and will remain an influential international power which is controlled and
administered from abroad.
Another indicative example is the situation with the Church of Jehovah’s
Witnesses. It appeared initially in Russia in the late 19th century and it was entirely
outlawed in the former Soviet Union for the clear-cut refusal not only to co-operate with
but even to conform silently to the rules of the Communist state (for example, many
Jehovah’s Witnesses young men were imprisoned for their refusal to serve in the Soviet
Army). After its legalization in the wake of Gorbachev’s political liberalization, the
Church of Jehovah’s Witnesses similarly with many other religious organizations
experienced a dynamic growth. The number of officially registered local Jehovah’s
Witnesses congregations in Russia increased from 92 in 1991 to 386 in 2004 (although the
latter number does not reflect numerous congregations existing without state registration),
and they claim to have about 133.000 members
The first lawsuit against Jehovah’s Witnesses in the post-Soviet Russia was filed
in 1998 by a Moscow regional prosecutor. It accused Jehovah’s Witnesses of inciting
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religious discord, breaking up families, violating individual Russian citizens’ rights, and
luring teenagers and minors.
In March 2004, after several years of legal battles, a District Court in northern
Moscow ruled to liquidate the legal entity of the Moscow organization of Jehovah’s
Witnesses and to impose a ban on their activities in Russia’s capital. The verdict of the
judge dismissed charges of religious hatred, but sustained charges of forcing families to
disintegrate, violating the equal rights of parents in the upbringing of their children,
violating the Russian Constitution and freedom of conscience, encouraging suicide,
encouraging the ill to refuse medicine for religious reasons, and inciting citizens to refuse
both military and alternative service. In June 2004, this decision was upheld by the
Moscow City Appeal Court.
The case of the Church of Jehovah’s Witnesses could have being seen as simply
another example of violations of religious freedom in Russia, but its two particular aspects
may have long-lasting implications for the future of religious liberty in Putin’s Russia.
First, one should remember that in 1988 Russia signed and joined the European
Convention on Human Rights, thus, committing itself to and recognizing the authority of
the European Court on Human Rights. The final decision of the Moscow court regarding
organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses was in this context in obvious contradiction with the
position of the European Court on Human Rights which, in June 2003, submitted
questions to the Russian government regarding its treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses in
Moscow. Second, the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses creates an important precedent in that a
particular religious organization was not simply refused state registration (which is helpful
but not required for a religious organization to operate), but it was also legally outlawed
on the territory of one of the country’s 89 administrative regions (the Church of Jehovah’s
Witnesses is still registered as a religious organization on the federal all-Russia level).
Both the attack on the Roman Catholic Church and the case of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses have received wide international public attention. Much less known are the
situations of the violations of the principles of religious freedom and equality which do
not involve the interests of the “foreign actors.”
A good example was a nationwide council (“sobor”) which was held in February
2004 by the Russian Orthodox Old-Believer Church with the goal to elect a new head of
the Church (“Metropolitan”). Shortly before this meeting, Old Believer priests across the
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country were summoned to visit the field offices of the FSB (Federal Security Service
which has replaced an infamous KGB) in their respective regions. The secret-police
officers asked the priests what they thought of the mainstream Russian Orthodox Church,
asked whom they intended to vote for as their new Metropolitan, and hinted at which of
the candidates the FSB preferred [Uzzell, 2004]. The Old Believers stayed firm to their
three-century tradition of tenacious independence from state pressure and rejected the
candidate suggested by the secret police, but this case has indicated clearly that a
characteristic “innovation” of Putin’s epoch (or rather a well-rehearsed return to the past
Communist practice) is an increasing desire of the state to monitor and, if necessary, to
intervene in the internal affairs of religious organizations. The example of the Orthodox
Old Believers is not unique. According to information released in July of this year by
Forum 18 News Service, the justice departments in the administrative regions of Samara,
Irkutsk, Perm, Tambov, Udmurtia, Ekaterinburg have requested various religious
organizations for full names, ages and addresses of church members [Forum, 2004a].
The last example - the continuing controversies around the theme of religious
education in the state schools - is a remarkable sign of the increasingly close ties between
the Moscow Patriarchate and Russian regional and national state authorities.
According to the Russian federal religious law: “Upon request of the parents and
under condition of agreement of the children, the administrations of the state and
municipal educational institutions shall provide possibilities for the religious organizations
to teach children religion beyond the schedule of the mandatory curricula.”
In other words, the law simply indicates that the facilities of the state schools
should be available for the voluntary religious lessons upon mutual desire and agreement
between parents, school administration and religious institutions. A public discussion has
emerged on the question of whether religious education must become a part of the
mandatory curricula in the state schools and, if “yes,” in which form it should be present:
either as the lessons “about religion” (in which case the children will be provided with
knowledge about the history and essentials of various religions) or rather as “religious
education” per se (in which case the children will be taught the doctrine, ethic and the
rituals of a particular religion).
Meanwhile the Orthodox Church has an increasing actual presence in the Russian
schools. In 1999, in a letter addressed to diocesan bishops, Patriarch Alexey II requested
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that they should “pay special attention to the organization of the Orthodox education of
the children studying in the state and in the municipal schools.” The letter also mentioned
that “if there will be any difficulties with the teaching of the basics of the Orthodox
religion, the lessons must be titled ‘The basics of the Orthodox culture’” [Shipkov, 2002].
The mandatory curricula in each state school consists of three components: federal, ethno-
regional and local. Of these components only the first one is under direct control of the
Federal Ministry of education and must be uniform for all schools nationwide. The
decisions about the contents of the ethno-regional and local segments are made by the
authorities at regional and local levels. As of summer 2004 in more than 20 (out of 89)
regions of Russian Federation, “The basics of the Orthodox culture” have been included
into the programs of state schools as a part of their ethno-regional or local components
[Yakovleva, 2004].
The Moscow Patriarchate has the possibility to lobby for the introduction of
Orthodox religious lessons not only in the individual regions of the Russian Federation (in
the frame-work of agreements signed between the ruling diocesan Orthodox bishops and
the regional state administrations) but also on the national level through the so-called
“Coordinating Council for relations between the Ministry of Education and the Russian
Orthodox Church.” One of the major proponents of the inclusion of the “Basics of the
Orthodox Culture” into mandatory curricula of the state school is Nikolaj Nikandrov - a
President of the Russian national Academy of Education [Petrov, 2004].
The position of the political leadership of the country with regard to this matter
seems also to be clear. In October 2002, the conference on “Relations between the state
and religious associations in the sphere of education” was held upon the initiative of the
three plenipotentiaries of the Russian president, who are responsible for the administrative
macro-regions in the European part of Russia (in addition to 89 administrative regions
governed by the elected governors, Russia is also divided into 7 macro-regions headed by
presidential appointees). All presidential plenipotentiaries as well as the representatives of
the Federal Ministry of Education supported introduction of the “Basics of the Orthodox
Culture” or similar subjects representing other traditional religions according to the so-
called “regional principle.” In the other words, they suggested teaching a religion which is
dominant in any of 89 administrative regions of Russia.
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Needless to say that such an approach would result in a situation in which not only
Russian Roman Catholics or Protestants, but also followers of Judaism (because of their
geographic dispersion), will have little chance to be present in the Russian state schools.
In January 2004, the Federal Ministry of Education held a Conference on “Study
of the Orthodox Culture in a secular school.” Although with several references to the
secular character of education in Russia, the final document adopted by the conference
suggested that “The role of Orthodox Christianity in creation, strengthening and
development of the Russian statehood and culture must be adequately reflected in the
federal state standard of general public education. This should be achieved first of all by
the relevant changes and additions in the federal component of state standard of general
education.”
Furthermore, it stipulated that “Inclusion into content of the general education of
the subject “Orthodox Culture” will contribute to spiritual upbringing of students and will
prevent the continuing mass-propaganda of the violence, sexual dissoluteness and social
irresponsibility that threaten the existence and future of the Russian state and society [NP,
2004].
Either state-sponsored pressure on certain “uncomfortable” religious groups (the
cases of Roman Catholics and Jehovah’s Witnesses), or desire to administer the internal
affairs of religious organizations (the example of Old Believers), or attempts to lobby the
interests of particular churches (the issue of Orthodox religious education in the public
schools) demonstrate that fifteen year after the fall of Communist atheistic state today’s
Russia is still far from the situation when proclaimed principles of religious freedom have
become a reality of the daily life of society. However, as passionate as they are in
transplanting to the Russian cultural soil the Western principles of democracy, human
rights activists will have little chance to succeed unless they take into consideration three
factors:
- the country’s distinct historical pattern of church-state relations;
- the current political realities;
- the social stereotypes widespread in Russian society.
There is little doubt that religious pluralism, clear-cut division between Church
and State, and an abundance of grass-roots church-based social initiatives have always
been among the fundamental elements of the American civic model. With certain nuances
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and at different times, this model has been adopted also by most Western European
countries. Quite differently, in Russia, the notion of the “national” and even “nationalized”
(or “state-owned”) Church has been historically inherited in the Russian mentality.
Ironically, despite entirely different political systems and ideologies, both in the
monarchic Russian Empire and in the Communist Soviet Union, the state was always
seeking for thorough control, and for administration of the religious affairs of society.
In the Russian Empire, the Orthodox Church was the only state church. The
famous triad “Orthodoxy – Autocracy – Peoplehood” formulated in the early 19th century
by Count Sergei Uvarov – a minister of education of the Russian Empire – pointed at the
oneness of these elements, and it has become an enduring symbol of the Russian
statehood. Yet, despite its privileged status, beginning from the 18th century the Russian
Orthodox Church entirely lost its independence from the secular authorities. Not only did
the state take away most of the Church’s lands and enterprises (thus depriving the Church
of its economic independence), but in 1721 Emperor Peter the Great abolished the position
of the Patriarch - the head of the Orthodox Church. Since that time and until 1917, it was
administered by the “Holy Governmental Synod”, which was headed by the secular
official - the “Attorney-General.” As for other religions, the state has controlled them
through the “Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Creeds” which was a part of the
Ministry of Interior. Indeed, the Russian Empire has been for centuries a multiethnic and
multi-religious country, where the numerous faith communities have co-existed more or
less peacefully. However, while the Russian Orthodox Church was supported by the state,
the other religions and churches were either tolerated or in some cases discriminated
against (or even persecuted).
On the popular level and by the commonly shared social stereotypes, there has
always been an amalgamation of three notions: “to be Russian (or in a broader sense
“Slav”)” and “to be a good citizen” and “to be an Orthodox Christian.”
After the revolution of 1917, the separation of church and state was declared. In
fact, however, it was the beginning of the state policy of atheism (called initially “militant
atheism”) which lasted for seven decades. The constitution of the Soviet Union guaranteed
equality of all religions and freedom of worship, but there is little question that religion
was repressed under Communist rule. The forms of repression, however, changed
significantly from outright persecutions during the 1920-30’s to grudging toleration with
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considerable civil discrimination against clergy and openly practicing believers from mid
1940s and until the mid 1980’s (while many religious organizations were still entirely
outlawed). In 1944, the so-called “Council for Religious Affairs” was established as a part
of the Soviet government with a network of commissioners in all administrative provinces
of the USSR. Serving de facto as a Ministry for Religious Affairs, the Council for
Religious Affairs supervised the activities of all religious organizations in the country, and
it existed until the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991.
In the mid 1980’s, Gorbachev’s policy of political liberalization was accompanied
by the gradual lifting of restrictions on religious activities. Religion was “allowed” to
return into public space. The de facto achieved emancipation of religious organizations
from the direct state supervision was legally secured in the law “About freedom of belief”
adopted in October 1990.
In today’s Russia, the religious life of society is regulated by the federal law
“About freedom of conscience and about religious associations” which was adopted in
September 1997 and which has replaced the previous law of 1990. In brief, the 1990 law
focused on various freedoms and rights granted to religious organizations and it
considered the religious life of society as a free market that is regulated only by natural
competition. The present (1997) legislation emphasizes the idea of co-operation between
the state and religious organizations in different spheres and depending on the social
significance and on the historical contribution of various religious communities in the
context of Russian society.
In many ways the 1997 legislation is also more restrictive with regard to religious
organizations which are recently established or which are of foreign origins. The 1997
law, for example, has put into operation for the newly established religious communities a
15 years census for obtaining a legal recognition by the state as a “religious organization”
– the status which provides essential privileges.
The introductory section of the 1997 law also caused numerous controversies and
criticism, because it included a sentence about the “special role of Orthodoxy in the
history of Russia and in the development of its spirituality and culture.” Several years
later, however, it has become clear both for the supporters and opponents of the privileged
position of the Russian Orthodox Church that this statement has no direct implications,
because the preamble of the law has no legal power.
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In Putin’s Russia, several attempts have been made to amend the legislation of
1997 with the purpose to define a limited number of so-called “traditional” religious
organizations and to grant them various legal privileges. For example, two bills were
submitted in 2002 by MPs Vasily Shandybin and Alexandr Chuev. Both of them by
defining the term “traditional” have suggested the criteria of long-term existence and the
barely measurable principle of “correspondence with Russian traditions.” In Mr.
Shandybin’s project, only Orthodox Christianity and Islam would be recognized as
religions traditional for Russia.
The former head of the parliamentary committee for “Affairs of public
associations and religious organizations” Mr. Viktor Zorkaltsev has proposed to consider
as traditional the religious organizations that have mainly Russian-based sources of
income and which are independent from the foreign religious administrative centers
[Verkhovskij, 2003].
Another bill “About social partnership of the state and religious organizations”
has been drafted by MP Mr. Sergej Glazjev, whose name is associated with the
Communist Party and with the so-called “Orthodox patriotic public” (pravoslavno-
patrioticheskaja obshestvennost). According to Mr. Glazjev, the main goal of the
amendment is the “development of treaty forms of co-operation between the state and the
Russian Orthodox Church and the other traditional religions in the such spheres of mutual
responsibility as upbringing of the young generation, education, assistance for prisoners,
support for health care institutions” [Nedumov, 2003]. This bill has defined as
“traditional” the Russian Orthodox Church and also “authorized in required order Islamic,
Buddhist and Jewish religious organizations existing in the areas of traditional compact
settlements of their followers” [Verkhovskij, 2003]. Neither the term “authorized in
required order,” nor the definition of “the areas of traditional compact settlements” have
been explained. In fact, by this approach Orthodox Old Believers, Russian Catholics and
Lutherans would have no chance to be recognized as a part of the country’s religious
establishment (although they have existed in Russia for centuries), and even Jewish
religious organizations would have only vague chances to be considered as traditional,
because of the geographic dispersion of Jews living in Russia.
Russia remains one of the few post-Soviet states (along with Georgia and
Lithuania), where there is no single national governmental agency supervising the
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religious life of society. While in the case of Western democracy this would be considered
as natural self-evident state of affairs, under the current Russian realities it leads to a
situation in which the actual conditions of religious freedom and pattern of relations
between state authorities and religious organizations vary significantly from one
administrative region to another. In this context, federal religious legislation is not always
obeyed or it is interpreted differently in the various parts of the country. Furthermore, after
1997 the legislatures of about 30 out of the country’s 89 administrative regions have
adopted their own “religious laws” many of which are not only “in addition” but also “in
contradiction” to the federal legislation.
More recently, from 2001 on, several Russian regions (Belgorod, Kursk,
Smolensk, Magadan) have produced laws aimed in particular against foreign missionary
workers.
In general, when decisions are made about regional religious issues and religious
organizations, they are frequently based on the local politics, personal interests and
loyalties of persons in positions of power, who either bring sections of federal legislation
into play when convenient or else act without reference to any law. In other words,
religious organizations are typically left to the mercy of the regional bureaucrats, while the
Kremlin and other federal authorities step into religious affairs only from time-to-time,
when the issues involved have some linkage with national politics (for example, the attack
on the Roman Catholic Church, and the lobbying of the interests of the Russian Orthodox
Church).
How do Russians themselves perceive the issue of religious liberty and what do
they think of religious freedom in Russia? Several circumstances are of importance in
order to approach accurately this question.
First, as shown in the second section, the phenomenon of “popular religiosity”
resulted in a situation when contemporary Russian society can be simultaneously defined
as both “Orthodox” and “agnostic.” Accordingly, only a small proportion of the
population is concerned with or even simply interested in the subject of religious freedom.
For instance, in 2002-2004 surveys only 13% of respondents have chosen “freedom of
conscience” as one of the most important human rights (Tab. 9).
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Tab. 9 Which of the following human rights are most important: you can choose several items? (% of
respondents)
2002 2004
The right for free education, free health service, social support of
senior citizens
70 74
Right for life 52 54
The right for a good job 51 51
The right for personal privacy and sanctity of the home 44 45
The right for a “living cost minimum” guaranteed by the state 35 41
Freedom to have a property 25 30
Freedom of speech 19 24
Freedom to obtain information 12 17
Freedom to choose people’s representatives in the
legislatures/authorities
8 14
Freedom to move to other country and/or return 13 13
Freedom of conscience 13 13
Source of data: [Obshestvennoe, 2004, p.124]
Second, we have also noted a dramatic decline of public confidence in the
institutions of state power, and, mass media, and political associations, and, at the same
time, the growing popularity of religious organizations, with the Russian Orthodox Church
in first place. On the one hand, the popularity of the Orthodox Church in Russia should
not be interpreted as a growth of direct clerical influence in the political sphere: only a tiny
proportion of Russians support the idea of the participation of the Orthodox Church and
clergy in political activities [Dubin,1999]. On the other hand, the latent influence of the
Orthodox Church on Russian society is much greater than it may seem. For example,
today only about a quarter of the population believes that the current social and political
impact of the Church in Russia is substantial [VCIOM, 2003]. However, in the wake of
the earlier mentioned conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, almost half the
respondents were of the view that if President Putin invited the Pope to Russia but the
Orthodox Church were opposed to this, the president should cancel his invitation
[VCIOM, 2001]. Most recent sociological studies have also reflected a new tendency in
the development of Church’s image in the people’s minds, which is an increasing
amalgamation of the notions “to be Russian” and “to be Orthodox” as well as “Orthodox”
and “National” [Obshestvennoe, 2002, p.160].
Third, the economic hardships and social polarization (that was unusual for Soviet
society) combined with political uncertainty and with the crisis of national identity led by
the end of Yeltsin’s epoch to a situation when a vast majority of the population was
looking for the restoration of a paternalist society and for a strong state power which
would take care of people’s basic needs (which was once the case in the Soviet Union). In
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the national survey carried out in 1998, only about one third of respondents believed that
“Russia needs a democratic system of administration”, while more than a half were of the
view that “Principles of Western Democracy are incompatible with Russian traditions,”
and three quarters of respondents were of the view that instead “Russia needs a strong and
masterful leader rather than all laws and discussions” (Tab. 10).
Tab. 10 Public Attitudes Towards Principles of Democracy in Russia (as % of respondents, public
opinion poll, October 1998)
Agree Disagree Difficult
to answer
Russia needs democratic system of administration 37.9 29.7 32.3
Russia needs strong and masterful leader rather than all laws and
discussions
73.7 17.7 8.6
Principles of Western Democracy are incompatible with Russian
traditions
54.8 27.1 18.1
Source of data: sociological survey carried out by Russin Centre for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM),
Oktober 1998 (unpublished);
These public sentiments based on the disappointment in the changes of the last
fifteen years and on the “romanticizing” of the good Soviet past continue to dominate. In a
2002 national survey, having been asked “Which of the changes that have occurred during
last 15 years have been the most important ones?,” by far larger groups of respondents
have chosen negative events and tendencies (break-up of USSR, growth of crime,
decreasing level of life, declining industrial and agricultural production), and only an
insignificant minority mentioned the benefits of the post-Communist epoch (freedom of
speech, mass-media and travels abroad; rapprochement with the “West;” possibility to
make big money).




Break-up of USSR 55
Growth of Crime 53
Decreasing level of life 49
Declining industrial and agricultural production 44
Disappearance of “deficit” (scarce, shortage) on various goods 42
Declining public moral 39
Negative, pernicious influence of “Western” culture 25
Re-establishment of private property 21
Freedom of speech, mass-media and travels abroad 18
Rapprochement with “West” 17
Possibility to make big money 16
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2002, p.19]
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Accordingly, in the same survey a relative majority of respondents (39 %) have
indicated their desire to return to the past and to live in the USSR under times of Leonid
Brezhnev (Tab. 12).
Tab. 12 If you would have a possibility to begin your life again, where and when you would prefer to
live (2002)?
Place and time % of respondents
responded “yes”
In USSR under times of Leonid Brezhnev 39
In Russia under Putin 23
In another country 17
In Russia before 1917 5
In the years of Gorbachev’s “perestrojka” 3
In USSR under Krushchev 3
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2002, p.20]
The amazing - and stable - personal popularity of President Putin among Russians
(63% in 2004, as seen in Tab.6) fits into these popular disappointments and aspirations.
While only 16% of Russians believe that Putin actually manages successfully the
problems of the country, 40% continue to hope that “Putin in the future will be able to
solve country’s problems” and 41% simply do not see anybody else that they can rely on
(Tab. 13).
Tab. 13 Why many people trust President Putin (% of respondents)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Putin has proved that he actually manages the problems of the
country successfully
14 21 15 16
People do not see anybody else that they can rely on 34 31 34 41
People hope that Putin in the future will be able to solve country’s
problems
43 44 46 40
Don’t know 9 4 5 3
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2004, p.47]
Under the three circumstances described above, the popular attitudes towards
various “other” (than Orthodox Christianity) religions have experienced significant
changes during the 1990s. In brief, the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s was
symbolized both by the general passion for “religion” per-se and by an essential interest in
the foreign religious missionaries and in the different new (in the context of Russian
culture) religious movements. The distribution of colorful religious booklets and certain
practical benefits (free courses of foreign languages offered by some religious missions,
for example) have played some role in the attraction of people’s attention. Yet, it was the
opening of political borders after decades of the isolated existence behind the iron curtain
which has resulted in public interest in everything (religion included) coming into Russia
from abroad, especially from the “West”.
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By the mid 1990s, this situation changed significantly. The growing negative
public attitude towards the so-called non-traditional religious organizations and foreign
missionaries became evident. For example, although in a national survey in 1997, 96% of
Russians agreed with the general principle of freedom of personal choice of belief
[VCIOM, 1998], only 40% of respondents supported the full legal equality of all religions
and churches. Moreover, 28% of the population stood up for direct restrictions on the
activity of non-traditional religious organizations in Russia [Mtchedlov, 1998].
These transformations in public attitudes in the religious sphere would be difficult
to explain unless they are seen as a part of the general growth of the anti-Western
sentiments in Russia in the late 1990s. For example, in 1996 48% of Russians were of the
view that ‘Western’ culture has a negative impact on the situation in Russia”, and in 2002
this proportion increased up to 67% [Obshestvennoe, 2002, p. 160].
The ideological strategy carefully orchestrated by Putin’s administration aimed at
creation of an image of a strong country which has its own unique way of development:
“Russia as neither Europe nor Asia.”
While appealing to a majority of the population, this concept has also led to the
flat rejection of the Western principles of democracy by many. In a 2000 survey,
responding to the question “Does the “Western” model of society suit Russia?”, over two
thirds of respondents were either simply skeptical about the possibility of using Western
principles of democracy in Russia or have even said that it contradicts the traditional style
of life in Russia.
Tab. 14 Does the “Western” model of society suit Russia? (2000, % of respondents)?
This is a universal model of society, which can be fully applied in Russia 4
This model of society can be adjusted for Russia’s conditions 15
It is unlikely that “Western” model of society can be developed in Russia 30
The “Western” model is not suitable for Russia and it contradicts the style of
life of the Russian people
37
Don’t know 13
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2002, p.159]
Surprisingly, only 15 years after the demolition of the iron curtain, the idea of
cultural separation from the rest of the world has made an appeal to at least half of the
population. In the same survey, when asked “Is it important for Russia to “join” world
culture and to adopt the life style of the majority of developed countries”, over half of
respondents have replied either that “it is not important” or “we should not strive for this
purpose at all” [Obshestvennoe, 2002].
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Tab. 15 Is it important for Russia to “join” world culture and to adopt the life style of the majority of
developed countries (2000)?
% of respondents
Yes, it is important 38
No, it is not important 31
We should not strive for this purpose at all. 20
Don’t know 11
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2002, p.160]
The increasing popularity of the idea of Russia’s unique way of development has
also resulted in the rise of xenophobic sentiments which became obvious in the late 1990s.
For instance, during 1998-2004 the proportion of those who entirely or partly support the
slogan “Russia for Russians only” increased from 46% to 59%, while the share of the
opponents of this idea declined from 32% to 25% (Tab. 16).
Tab. 16 How do you feel about idea “Russia for Russians only” (% of respondents responded)?
1998 2002 2004
I support it entirely 15 17 22
It will be good to realize it, but within certain limits 31 38 37
I feel negative: this is a real fascism 32 28 25
I don’t care or never thought about it 22 17 17
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2004, p.141]
Accordingly, in the religious sphere, the beginning of the third millennium has
been symbolized by a new tendency: an increasingly negative popular perception of not
only “non-traditional” or “foreign,” but all “other” (than Orthodox Christian) religions. In
the all-Russian survey in September 2002, 51% of Russians supported the actions of state
authorities directed against the Roman Catholic clergy in Russia. In a public opinion poll
in Moscow in March 2002, half of the respondents were of the view that Islam is a religion
which is hostile to Orthodox Christianity. [Obshestvennoe, 2002, p.148].
The future of religious tolerance and inter-religious relations in Russia is a
difficult and controversial question. In a largely agnostic society, most people do not think
in “religious categories.” Therefore being asked straight-forwardly about their feelings
with regard to the followers of various religions Russians demonstrate reasonably high
level of tolerance (Tab. 17).
Tab. 17 What are your feelings with regard to the followers of the following religions (% of respondents,
2004)
Sympathy and/or respect Fear and/or hostility Contradictory feelings or
don’t know
O r t h o d o x
Christians
83 0 17
Catholics 75 6 19
Protestants 62 11 27
Muslims 59 17 24
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Jews 57 15 28
“ O r i e n t a l ”
religions
58 13 29
Atheists 62 13 25
On the other hand, in the multicultural society religion can serve as one of the
criteria and a label to distinguish between “good us” and “bad them.” Accordingly, in
Russia the sudden expressions of religious intolerance can always be associated with the
growing inter-ethnic tensions (Tab. 18 and 19).
Tab. 18 Do you agree that ethnic minorities have accumulated too much power in Russia (% of
respondents)?
2004
“Yes” or “rather yes” 47
“No” or “rather no” 44
I do not know 8
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2004, p.139]
Tab 19 Do you agree that the influence of Jews must be limited in the state administration, politics,
business, legislation and education system (% of respondents)?
2004
“Yes” or “rather yes” 49
“No” or “rather no” 41
I do not know 10
Source: [Obshestvennoe, 2004, p.139]
5. Some Concluding Remarks: Where Russia is Heading?
In the previously cited article, Lawrence Uzzell arrives at the conclusion that
today Russia “is reviving the old habit of treating every social institution, whether secular
or religious, as if it were an extension of the state.” [Uzzell, 2004]. In this context, current
conditions of religious liberty in Russian society are characterized by three most
distinctive features:
1) After the short period of the situation of the “free religious market” regulated only by
the natural competition between various churches, Russia returned to the historically more
familiar pattern of different treatment of various religious organizations by the secular
authorities: support for some and discrimination (direct or indirect) against the others;
2) Today the mainstream national leaders of Russia’s major religious communities and
organizations are not only incapable or afraid but also unwilling to criticize the policies of
state authorities on any issues the Kremlin considers important. In return for their ultimate
and unquestionable loyalty the Russian state discriminates in favor of these mainstream
leaders both against other (“new,” “foreign,” etc) religions and against rivals within their
own religious communities.
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3) “Religious freedom” is seen by the Russian state authorities not as a fundamental and
unconditional principle, but rather as something which can be granted or taken back
depending on circumstances.
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Attachment 1 Religious Communities registered by the state in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic (01.01.1991) and in Russian Federation (01.01.2004) (*)






























































































































































(*) “Religious Communities” = places of regular public worship + administrative centers of religious
organizations + monasteries + religious brotherhoods +theological educational institutions
Sources of data: a) 1991 - annual report of “Council for Religious Affairs attached to the Council of
Ministers of the USSR” (“Sovet po delam religij pri sovete ministrov SSSR”), unpublished; b) 2004 - Ministry
of Justice of Russia, department for affairs of public and religious organizations: statistic of state registration
of religious organizations (unpublished).
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